Firm heterogeneity, foreign direct investment and the host-country welfare: Trade costs vs. cheap labor by Arijit Mukherjee
      










Firm heterogeneity, foreign direct investment and the host-
country welfare:  Trade costs vs. cheap labor 
 
 





 2007    DP 07/05 Firm heterogeneity, foreign direct investment and the host-





University of Nottingham and The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation 




Abstract: Whether higher productivity of the foreign firm increases host country 
welfare depends on whether the reason for foreign direct investment (FDI) is to save 
the trade cost or to get the advantage of cheap labor. We show that, if the reason for 
FDI is to get the advantage of cheap labor, higher productivity of the foreign firm 
may reduce host-country welfare. Higher productivity of the foreign firm always 
increases (may reduce) host-country welfare if the reason for FDI is to save trade 
cost, while the trade cost implies transportation cost (tariff). Thus, the present paper 
compliments the recent literature in international trade that explores the effects of the 
foreign firms’ productivities on the incentives for FDI. 
   
  
Key Words: Cheap labor; Foreign direct investment; Host-country welfare; Trade 
cost 
JEL Classification: F21; F23 
 
Correspondence to: Arijit Mukherjee, School of Economics, University of 
Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK 
E-mail: arijit.mukherjee@nottingham.ac.uk 
Fax: +44-115-951 4159 
 
_____________________________ 
* I would like to thank Sugata Marjit and Zhihong Yu for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
   1
Firm heterogeneity, foreign direct investment and the host-
country welfare: Trade cost vs. cheap labor 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Many developing countries are now liberalizing their economies and trying to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Empirical evidence shows that multinationals 
account for a significant portion of international trade. For example, using the data 
from 1999, Caves et al. (2002) has demonstrated that over 60% of multinational trade 
can be traced to a small set of developed countries and that 70% of their foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is hosted by industrial countries. This dominance of FDI over 
international trade has generated a significant of empirical and theoretical research.
1 
Multinationals often face the important choice of export vs. FDI, and the 
recent literature shows that the productivities of the multinationals may play 
important roles in this respect. Helpman et al. (2004) show if the reason for the FDI is 
to save trade cost, relatively more productive firms do FDI.
2 Head and Ries (2003) 
extends this line of research and show that if the reason for FDI is to get the 
advantage of lower cost of production, whether the more productive firms do FDI is 
ambiguous (Head and Ries, 2003). While both the papers show useful results about 
the foreign firms’ equilibrium production strategies, they are silent about the 
implications of the productivities of the foreign firms on the host-country welfare, 
which may be important for designing FDI policies. 
                                                      
1 For recent surveys on foreign direct investment, one may refer to Pack and Saggi (1997) and Saggi 
(2002).  
2 Helpman et al. (2004) extend the line of research conducted by Melitz (2003), which determines the 
relationship between firm productivity and the incentive for entering the export market.   2
In this paper, we use a simple model to show that whether higher productivity 
of the foreign firm increases host-country welfare depends on the reason for FDI. If 
the reason for doing FDI is to save trade cost, the incentive for FDI increases as the 
foreign firm becomes more productive, whereas, if the reason for doing FDI is to get 
the advantage of cheap labor, the incentive for FDI decreases with foreign firm’s 
higher productivity if the foreign firm is already very productive. 
The effects of the foreign firm’s productivity on the host-country welfare 
show that if the reason for FDI is to save trade cost and the trade cost implies 
transportation cost, the higher productivity of the foreign firm always increases host-
country welfare. However, if the trade cost implies tariff, the higher productivity of 
the foreign firm may reduce host-country welfare. But, if the reason for FDI is to get 
the advantage of cheap labor, the higher productivity of the foreign firm may reduce 
host-country welfare if the higher productivity of the foreign firm induces it to shift 
its production strategy from FDI to export. 
Hence, if there is no other benefit from FDI such as knowledge spillover that 
may help the host-country firms, it is not necessary that a host-country will always be 
interested to attract a foreign firm with higher productivity. Therefore, a competent 
FDI policy is required depending on the main reason for FDI. For example, if the 
main reason for FDI is to get the advantage of lower wage rate, a host-country may 
provide higher incentive for FDI to a relatively higher productive foreign firm, who 
otherwise prefers to do exporting than FDI. In contrast, if the main reason for FDI is 
to save the trade cost, where tariff rate is the main element of the trade cost, a host-
country may prefer to prevent a relatively higher productive foreign firm from doing 
FDI, who otherwise can do FDI.   3
  The present paper is related to an earlier literature, which shows that free trade 
(where the foreign firm does exports) may reduce host-country welfare in an 
imperfectly competitive market (se, e.g., Brander, 1981, Markusen, 1981). However, 
unlike those papers, the present paper considers both trade (i.e., export by the foreign 
firm) and FDI, and our results depend on how productivity improvement of the 
foreign firm affects its production or plant location strategy. Further, we show that 
higher productivity of the foreign firm may reduce host-country welfare in an 
economy with foreign monopoly, which does not occur in the above-mentioned 
papers. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops 
the model and provides the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and results  
Assume that there is a foreign firm who wants to sell its product in a foreign country, 
called host-country. Firm 1 can sell its product to the host-country either through 
export or through FDI. In case of export, firm 1 produces outputs in its home country 
and sells to the host-country. In case of FDI, firm 1 produces and sells in the host-
country. However, under FDI, firm 1 needs to incur a fixed sunk cost F . 
  We assume that firm 1 has Leontief production function and, for simplicity, 
assume that it uses only labor as its factor of production. Labors are assumed to be 
immobile between the home country of firm 1 and the host-country. Assume that firm 
1 needs λ  units of labor to produce one unit of output. Lower value of λ  implies that 
firm 1’s productivity has increased. We assume that the input markets in both the 
home country of firm 1 and the host-country country are perfectly competitive. Wage 
rate in the home country is given by w.   4
The inverse market demand in the host-country is given by 
  q a P − = ,           ( 1 )  
where the notations have usual meanings. 
Hence, our setup is similar to the single industry case of Head and Ries 
(2003). However, it is trivial that replicating this industry n times will not change our 
qualitative results. It is worth mentioning that higher entry cost and significant 
product differentiation may be the reasons for creating foreign monopoly. 
Alternatively, we may assume that paten protection on firm 1’s product may create 
foreign monopoly. We will discuss the implications of the existence of host-country 
firms in the concluding section.  
 
2.1. FDI to save trade cost 
In this subsection we consider that the incentive for FDI comes from the existence of 
trade cost under exporting. So, in this subsection we assume that the wage rates in 
both the home and the host countries are w but if firm 1 wants to do export, it has to 
incur a trade cost t per-unit output. FDI helps firm 1 to save the trade cost. 
  It is well known that trade cost may involve both transportation cost and tariff 
rate. However, it is clear that these interpretations of trade costs have different 
implications for the host-country welfare. If trade cost implies tariff rate then tariff 
revenue becomes a part of the host-country welfare and makes the host-country 
welfare different from the situation where trade cost implies transportation cost. 
In the text of this paper, we will consider trade cost as transportation cost or 
exogenous tariff rate, which is determined outside of this model. In the Appendix, we 
show that our qualitative results hold for endogenous tariff rate, which maximizes the 
host-country welfare. Hence, it will also confirm that the predictions of Head and   5
Ries (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004), those are based on exogenous trade cost, hold 
even with endogenous trade cost. 
  If firm 1 does export, it maximizes the following expression: 
  q t w q a Max
q
) ( − − − λ .        ( 2 )  
Maximizing (2), we find that the equilibrium output and profit of firm 1 under export 
are respectively 
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π . Second order condition for 
maximization is satisfied. Further, for simplicity, we assume throughout our analysis 
that profit from export is always positive. 
  If firm 1 does FDI, it maximizes the following expression: 
  F q w q a Max
q
− − − ) ( λ .         ( 3 )  
Maximizing (3), we find that the equilibrium output and profit of firm 1 under export 
are respectively 
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π . Second order condition for 
maximization is satisfied. Further, for simplicity, we assume throughout our analysis 
that net profit from FDI is always positive.  
  So, firm 1 does FDI if and only if 
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Proposition 1: Firm 1’s incentive for FDI increases with lower λ .   6










if  λ  reduces, it increases the value of  1 F  and hence, increases the range of F  over 
which firm 1 does FDI.                    Q.E.D. 
 
The above proposition shows that if firm 1 becomes more productive, it has 
higher incentive for FDI. Since, here FDI saves trade cost, the productivity of firm 1, 
i.e.,  λ , does not affect the incentive for FDI directly but it affects the incentive for 
FDI indirectly by affecting the equilibrium output. As firm 1 becomes more 
productive, it increases firm 1’s output and therefore, FDI helps to save higher 
amount of total trade cost, which is  f tq . So, the higher productivity of firm 1 
increases its incentive for FDI. 
The above discussion suggests that there are two effects of the higher 
productivity of firm 1: (1) technological effect (reducing λ ) and (2) location effect 
(changing production or plant location strategy). The technological effect increases 
firm 1’s output. However, since firm 1 may shift its production from export to FDI if 
it becomes more productive, this location effect may also increase output by saving 
the trade cost. So, if the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, it is clear that both these 
effects go in the same direction to increase output of firm 1. 
It is important to note that if trade cost implies exogenous tariff rate then the 
location effect, by shifting production from export to FDI, generates lower tariff 
revenue for the host-country country, thus creating a negative impact on the host-
                                                      
3 Note that if trade cost implies tariff rate and is determined endogenously, it is important to see the 
effect of the higher productivity of the foreign firm on the tariff rate and its implication on the foreign 
firm’s production strategy. We address this issue in the Appendix.    7
country welfare.
4 It is straightforward to see that if higher productivity of the foreign 
firm does not create location effect, the host-country welfare is always higher with 
higher productivity of the foreign firm in case of exogenously given tariff rate. Given 
the exogenous tariff rate, higher productivity of the foreign firm increases its output, 
thus increasing consumer surplus and the tariff revenue of the host-country, which, in 
turn, increases the host-country welfare. 
Let us now see how higher productivity of the foreign firm affects the host-
country welfare under exogenous tariff and when there is location effect. If trade cost 
implies exogenous tariff and firm 1’s labor co-efficient reduces from  0 λ  to  1 λ  and 
also shifts firm 1’s production from export to FDI, the host-country welfare under  0 λ  
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. Note 
that the second term in the host-country welfare under  0 λ  is due to tariff revenue, 
which is zero if trade cost implies transport cost. Comparing welfare of the host-
country under  0 λ  and under  1 λ , we find that higher productivity of the foreign firm 
increases the host-country welfare provided   




1 t w a t w a w a − − > − − − λ λ λ .      (5) 
 
Hence, the following proposition is immediate. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose the reason for FDI is to save trade cost. 
                                                      
4 Here, the host-country welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and tariff revenue. Since, we implicitly 
assume that there is no unemployment in our analysis, and since, the wage rates of the host-country 
workers are the same in this industry and in the alternative jobs, a change in the labor income in this 
industry following the productivity change of the foreign firm does not affect the host-country welfare. 
The implication of unemployment can be derived easily from our analysis.   8
(a) If trade cost implies transportation cost, higher productivity of firm 1 always 
increases the host-country welfare. 
(b) If trade cost implies (exogenous) tariff, higher productivity of firm 1 increases the 
host-country welfare if higher productivity of firm 1 either (i) creates no location 
effect or (ii) creates location effect but satisfies condition (5). 
 
2.2. FDI to get the advantage of cheap labor 
In this subsection we consider that the reason for FDI is to get the advantage of cheap 
labor in the host-country. So, in this subsection we assume that there is not trade cost 
involved under export, i.e.,  0 = t , but wage rate in the host-country is lower by 
amount  α  compared to the wage rate in the home country of firm 1, where 
] , 0 ( w ∈ α . Therefore, the wage rate under export and FDI are respectively w and 
) ( α − w . 
  If firm 1 does export, it maximizes the following expression: 
  q w q a Max
q
) ( λ − − .          ( 6 )  
Maximizing (6), we find that the equilibrium output and profit of firm 1 under export 
are respectively 
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qx
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= . Second order condition for 
maximization is satisfied. 
  If firm 1 does FDI, it maximizes the following expression: 
  F q w q a Max
q
− − − − )) ( ( α λ .         ( 7 )  
Maximizing (7), we find that equilibrium output and profit of firm 1 under export are 
respectively 
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π . Second order 
condition for maximization is satisfied.   9
  So, firm 1 does FDI provided 
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      ( 8 )  
Condition (8) shows that firm 1 does FDI for  2 F F < ; otherwise, firm 1 does export. 
 














. But, firm 1’s incentive for FDI decreases with 
lower λ  for 
* λ λ < . 
Proof: Differentiating  2 F  with respect to λ , we find that 
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. Since, profit of firm 1 under export is 
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λ λ ∈  and, in this situation, firm 1’s incentive for FDI increases 







* λ λ <  and, in this situation, firm 1’s incentive for 
FDI decrease with lower λ . This proves the result.                Q.E.D. 
 
The above proposition shows that if the incentive for FDI comes from the 
advantage of cheap labor, the relationship between the incentive for FDI and firm 1’s 
productivity is ambiguous. If FDI gives the advantage of cheap labor, higher   10
productivity of firm 1 has both direct and indirect effects. Since, higher productivity 
of firm 1 reduces λ , it makes export relatively less costly and directly creates lower 
advantage of FDI. But, lower value of λ  increases the incentive for FDI indirectly by 
affecting the equilibrium output of firm 1, which is higher under FDI. When λ  is 
sufficiently high, the effect of a lower λ  through higher equilibrium output under FDI 
dominates the direct effect of lower relative cost of export and makes FDI more 
attractive. But, if λ  is sufficiently small, the difference between the equilibrium 
outputs under FDI and export is not sufficiently large. Hence, in this situation, the 
advantage from higher output under FDI is not sufficiently large and is dominated by 
the direct effect for relatively lower cost of export. So, if λ  is sufficiently small, 
higher productivity of firm 1 reduces the incentive for FDI.    
  Unlike the previous subsection, where the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, 
the above proposition suggests that there may be conflicting effects on the host-
country welfare if firm 1’s productivity increases. If firm 1’s productivity increases, it 
becomes more technologically efficient, which creates production efficiency. Hence, 
this technological effect creates positive impact on the host-country welfare. 
However, if 
* λ λ < , firm 1 may shift its production strategy from FDI to export if it 
becomes more technologically efficient. Hence, in this situation, the location effect is 
opposite to the previous subsection and creates negative impact on the host-country 
welfare by shifting firm 1’s production from the low wage country to the high wage 
country and hence, reducing its output. 
Comparing consumer surplus of the host-country, which is also equal to the 
host-country welfare, we find that if firm 1’s productivity increases from  0 λ  to  1 λ , 
and also shifts firm 1’s production from FDI to export, consumer surplus reduces with 
the higher productivity of firm 1 provided   11
0







.            ( 9 )  
So, if the wage rate in the host-country is sufficiently lower compared to the home 
country of firm 1, the higher productivity of firm 1 may reduce the host-country 
welfare if it shifts frm1’s production from FDI to export. 




λ λ ∈ , the above proposition shows that the location effect shifts 
firm 1’s production strategy from export to FDI.  Therefore, in this situation, the 
location effect also creates a positive effect on the host-country welfare by shifting its 
production from export (i.e., production from a high wage country) to FDI (i.e., 
production to a low wage country). 
  The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: Suppose the reason for FDI is to get the advantage of cheap labor. 
(a) If 
* λ λ < , higher productivity of firm 1 reduces the host-country welfare when it 
shifts firm 1’s production strategy from FDI to export and condition (9) holds. 








Two important reasons for observing FDI are the trade cost saving and the benefits of 
cheap labor. We show that the effects of these incentives for FDI may affect the host-
country welfare significantly. Hence, while designing FDI polices, the governments 
need to be careful about the reason for FDI.    12
  The relationship between the productivity of the foreign firm and the incentive 
for FDI is positive if the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, while the relationship 
may be negative if the reason for FDI is to get the advantage of cheap labor. If the 
reason for FDI is to get the advantage of cheap labor, the incentive for FDI increases 
(decreases) with foreign firm’s higher productivity if the initial technology of the 
foreign firm is sufficiently inferior (superior). 
We show that if the reason for FDI is to get the advantage of cheap labor, 
higher productivity of the foreign firm may reduce host-country welfare, while higher 
productivity of the foreign firm always increases host-country welfare if the reason 
for FDI is to save trade cost and trade cost implies transportation cost. If trade cost 
implies tariff, the host-country welfare may reduce with higher productivity of the 
foreign firm even if the reason for FDI is to save trade cost.  
  In our analysis, we have focused on the production strategy of a foreign 
monopolist, thus ignoring the effects of FDI and exporting on the profitability of the 
host-country firms. However, it should be immediate that since the marginal cost of 
the foreign firm is lower under FDI (irrespective of the reason for FDI) compared to 
export, if higher productivity of the foreign firm increase the incentive for FDI, it 
increase the possibility of lower host-country welfare by reducing the profits of the 
host-country firms. But, if higher productivity of the foreign firm reduces the 
incentive for FDI, it helps to increase host-country welfare by increasing the profits of 




   13
Appendix 
Trade cost as endogenous tariff rate: Let us consider trade cost as endogenously 
determined tariff rate, which maximizes host-country welfare. 
Consider the following game for this situation. At stage 1, firm 1 decides 
whether to do FDI or export. If firm 1 decides to do export, in stage 2, the host-
country government chooses the tariff rate to maximize the host-country welfare. At 
stage 3, production takes place and the profits are realized.
5 We solve the game 
through backward induction. 









π ,                       (A1) 
for a given value of λ .  









π ,                       (A2) 
given the welfare maximizing unit tariff rate t, and λ .  
  If firm 1 does exports, the host-country government chooses t to maximize 
the host-country welfare, which is the sum of tariff revenue and consumer surplus. So, 
the host-country government maximizes the following expression: 
 
8
) ( ) ( 4
2 t w a t w a t
Max
t
− − + − − λ λ
.                   (A3) 
Maximizing (A3), we find the equilibrium tariff rate is 
3
) ( * w a
t
λ −
= . Second order 
condition for maximization is satisfied. So, given λ , the profit of firm 1 under export 









= .                       (A4) 
Therefore, given λ , firm 1 does FDI provided 










.                     (A5) 
It is clear from (A5) that  0
18




′ ∂ w a F λ
λ
. So, the effect of the higher 
productivity of the foreign firm on the critical fixed cost of FDI is similar to the one 
shown in Proposition 1. So, it confirms our result of Proposition 1 even under 
endogenous tariff rate. 
  Now, we examine the effect of λ  on the host-country welfare. If firm 1 does 
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= .                       (A7) 
It is clear from (A6) and (A7) that if the change in the firm 1’s productivity does not 
affect its decision on FDI and export, higher productivity of firm 1 always increases 
the host-country welfare. 
  However, as we have seen the higher productivity of firm 1 increases its 
incentive for FDI. If firm 1’s productivity increases from  0 λ  to  1 λ  (i.e.,  0 1 λ λ < ) and 
shifts its production decision from export to FDI, the host-country welfare under  0 λ  









1w a λ −
. Comparing these expressions for 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 This move of the game is consistent under the problem of ‘time consistency’ as mentioned in 
Aizenman (1992), Al-saadon and Das (1996), Kabiraj and Marjit (2003) and many others.   15
the host-country welfare, we find that higher productivity of firm 1 increases the host-
country welfare provided 
) 3 2 (
) 3 2 (




w .                       (A8) 
Given that firm 1’s net profits under export and FDI are positive, w must be less than 
0 λ
a
. We find that while (A8) does not hold with  0 = w , it holds for 
0 λ
a
w = . So, like 
Proposition 2(b), if firm 1’s higher productivity creates the location effect but 
condition (A8) is satisfied, higher productivity of firm 1 increases the host-country 
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